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Trading Behavior
and Firm-Specific Characteristics
During the Crash of 1987:
Evidence from the Netherlands
Uri Ben-Zion
Rezaul Kabir
SUMMARY. The October 1987 crash was a worldwide evjnt. All
the major stock exchanges in the world declined significantly on
Monday, the I9ih and Tuesday, the 20th of October. Financial econo-
mists have been trying to exphin this sudden decline. In this paper,
we examine a few issues wilr respect to the effects of the crash.
First, we look at the major determinants of stock return and test the
ciistcnce of any panic behavicr and overreaction. Second, ve look
at the behavior of option returns during the crash period. Third, we
ajialyre the daily trading volume behavior of individual stocks. And
fhally, we test an investment strategy to make use of the orerreac-
lion behavior of the market to "make money."
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The October 1987 crash was a worldwide event. All tie major
stock exchanges in the world declined significantly on Monday, the
19th and Tuesday, the 20th of October. For example, in the Nether-
lands, the CBS Tendency Index-an unweighted average of most
active shares traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange-went down
almost 9.5% on October 19, and dropped another 4.6% on the
following day. This can be compared with Standard & Poor's 500
Stock Index in the United States which declined 20.5% on October
19, aid increased by 5.3% on October 20.
Financial economists have been trying over the past years to
expkin this sudden decline. Several studies on the impact of the
crash have been published including international comparison of
the reaction of stock market indices and an analysis of the behavior
of individual stock returns. TheBrady Commission Report of 1988
in the U.S. cites index arbitrage and portfolio insurance as primary
reasons for the sharp decline in stock prices. Many researchers do
not share this feeling, and suggest that the crash was caused rather
by fundamental factors such as a sudden realisation of tower ex-
pected returns, upward revision of required returns, etc.
Kyle (1988) puts forward three competing explanations for the
crash: information shock, selling pressure and too few buyers, and
supports the last two factors. Mitchell and Netter (1989) suggest
that the 10% decline in the U.S. during October 14-16 nay have
triggered the crash. They show lhat proposed changes in UK tax rule
regaiding leverage buyout (nordeductibility of interest costs) con-
tributed to this pre-crash decline. Roll (1988) disagrees with the
widely-expressed view that the U.S. stock market pulled down all the
othei markets on October 19. He attributes the crash to the normal
response of each country's stcck market to a worldwid: market
movement. This international comparison was extended and con-
firmed in the work of Bertero and Mayer (1990). In explaining the
crash, Amihud, Mendelson and Wood (1990) argue that the lack of
liquidity associated with an increased bid-ask spread anc reduced
market depth in the stock market contributed to the decline of stock
prices. The dramatic drop in shire prices also coincides wkh a huge
increase in volatility. Schwert (1990) finds that volatility is high
durirg periods of stock market decline and that it gradually falls
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back to normal levels. In the case of 1987 in the U.S., the peak was
higher than usual, and the decline was more rapid.
The October crash has also drawn attention to issues surrounding
the relationship among different securities markets. The integration
of the stock, futures, and options market during the crash is ana-
lyzed by Miller (1991) and Kleidon and Whaley (1992). By ana-
lyzing the relationship between index futures and the underlying
cash market, Miller found that the two markets were disconnected
on October 19. The results of Kleidon and Wialey suggest that
although the usual links between futures and options markets re-
mained largely intact, both of these markets showed breakdowns
with the cash market. The crash has also led to a significant change
in international stock market Linkages. Arshampalli and Doukas
(1993) report that the degree of interdependence between major
European stock markets and the U.S. stock market has increased
substantially since the crash of October 1987.
Studies of stock returns in the crash indicate that market partici-
pants showed panic behavior (Ferguson, 1988). Markets seemed to
overreact on the first day while correction took place on the fol-
lowing days. The overreaction occurs also on an individual securi-
ties level, where securities that declined more or less than the av-
erage adjusted toward the mean the following d»y. Greenwald and
Stein (1991) report that in the last hour of trading on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) on October 19, heavy selling volume
pushed prices down approximately 12%, resulting in an overall
market decline of more than 20% for the day. Because of the large
number of overnight buy orders, the market opened up on October
20 about 12% above Monday's close.
One interesting characteristic of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange
(ASE) is that it was one of the few European Exchanges that re-
mained open when the crash in the New York Stock Exchange
started at 9:30 a.m. Nsw York time (3:30 p.m. in Amsterdam). Due
to the time-zone difference, the ASE always opens before the
NYSE. Thus, it was possible for the ASE to lead in different phases
of the crash. The 12.6% decline of the CBS Tendency Index on the
ASE between 10:00 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. (before the opening of the
NYSE) was ahead of ihe decline in the NYSE. Tkis, however, could
have been a response to the U.S. decline of 10.5% during October
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14-16. On the other hand, the 20%> decline in the S&P 500 index in
the NYSE on the 19th of October was followed by a 9% cvemight
decline of the CBS index on the ASE. The correction of the U.S.
market on the 20th (5.3%) was preceded by an 8.6% increase be-
tween 10 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. on the same day on the ASE Finally,
the overnight return of October 21 on the ASE (4.2%) could have
been £ response to the U.S. market's reaction on the previous day,
i.e., October 20 (5.3%) or a prediction of the U.S. market for the
following day, i.e., October 21 (9.1%). The difference between the
closing prices of October 19 and the opening prices of October 20
(i.e., overnight return) can be viewed as the direct impact of the
crash in the U.S. The intraday behavior of prices on Tuesday, Oc-
tober 20, from open to close reflects more independent evaluation
of the stock market by traders in Amsterdam.
The crash also had a significant impact on the increased trading
activity which may reflect increased uncertainty and diverse ex-
pectation of market participants. Turnover of shares on the Am-
sterdam Stock Exchange on October 19 was three times the average
daily turnover for the first nine months of 1987. On the 20th of
October, it was even four times the average. The significant in-
crease in volume of trade on October 19, which occurred before the
crash in New York, indicates that there have been other factors
which increased uncertainty in the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.
This increased volume of trade is consistent with findings seen in
other stock markets (e.g., Ben-Zion et al., 1990).
In this paper, we investigate a few issues with respect to the
effects of the crash on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. First, we
look at the major determinants of the decline of different stocks
during the crash. Second, we look at the behavior of returns of call
and put options for all underlying Dutch stocks. The use cf options
may be of particular interest since, for any given change in the price
(return) of stocks, the change in option prices are much more signif-
icant. Third, we analyze the daily trading volume behavior of indi-
vidual stocks during the crash period, and last, we test a possible
strategy to make use of the oveireaction behavior of the market to
"maks money."
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section I, a
brief discussion of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange is provided; in
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section n, we discuss possible determinants of stock return and
trading volume; in section ID, we present our model; section IV
describes the data; section V presents the empirical results; section
VI develops an investment strategy and report! the findings; and
section VII concludes and summarizes our results.
/. AMSJERDAM STOCK EXCHANGE
The Amsterdam Stock Exchange is the only stock exchange op-
erating in the Netherlands. Trading takes place mostly on the offi-
cial market and the official parallel market. The official market is
the first-tier market for listing of relatively large companies. The
parallel market is operating since 1982 with the lira to enable small
and medium companies to trade publicly. In addition, there is an
over-the-counter market to trade securities which are not officially
listed.
Until 1985, most securities were traded on the basis of one price
fixed at the end of first or/and second round of dealing. But since
then all securities are traded and quoted continuously. Each transac-
tion on the Exchange is executed by a "hoeknun" who until July
1990 worked with fixed commissions. A "hoeknian" is comparable
with a "specialist" of the New York Stock Exchange, with the
following major difference: for each share, there are more than one
"hoekman." The "hoekman" is assigned responsibility for the
trading in a certain stock, but does not have the obligation to make a
market. He will trade for his own account only to keep the market
liquid.
The trading system on the ASE can be characterized as an order-
driven system. All orders, whether buy or sell, arrive through bro-
kers with the "hoeknran," and are first matched and then executed
at one single price. Tie price is fixed in such a way that maximum
number of buy and sell orders can be satisfied. No bid or ask price
can be distinguished. The Stock Exchange operates on a cash basis;
forward trading is no! customary in the Netherlands. An automated
information system las been installed in 1988 thus making elec-
tronic contact among the members possible. Tke system provides
trade information and business data only to stockbrokers, the
trading floor and the securities clearing system. There is no seat
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system on the Exchange. Anybody satisfying all set requirements
(minimum capitalization, independence and skill) is eligible for
membership.
There were 564 companies listed on the Exchange in 1992 with
more than 1600 different securities officially traded. Almost 60% of
these securities were domestic aid foreign bonds. Close to 45% of
the shares were foreign (mostly American) shares. The market
value of all Dutch common shares listed on the ASE at the end of
1992 amounted to almost 300 billions of guilders. The ten largest
firms account for around two-thirds of total stock market capitaliza-
tion, vith one firm-Royal Dutch Petroleum-making up almost one-
third and another firm-Unilever-making up almost 13%. Total
tradirg volume of shares has increased from 121 billions of guilders
in 19S8 to 156 billions in 1992. Shares of international companies
and investment institutions account for 33% and 17% respectively,
of the effective turnover on the Stock Exchange. The estimated
shares of individual investors, institutional investors and foreign
investors in total share turnover in 1992 were 20%, 25% and 51%,
respectively.
//. DETERMINANTS OF STOCK RETURN
AND TRADING VOLUME
Stock Return
Empirical studies of stock markets suggest that individual stock
returns follow a simple market model,
where, /?,, and / ,̂, are the return in period t of security i and the
market, respectively, fy is the systematic risk measure of security i,
and un is the non-systematic random factor in period f. In efficient
markets, «,, is not serially correlated (i.e., we expect Covfat, un-i)
= 0 and Cov(Ritt, R^.i) = 0).
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), addi-
tional factors, other than the systematic risk measure, are not very
relevant in explaining the daily return of a security. However, in a
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situation of panic behavior, the beta factor may not be the only
explanatory variable. One relevant variable in panic behavior is the
liquidity of the security since investors first try to get rid of their
liquid risky assets (e.g., Grossman (1989), Lauterbach and Ben-
Zion (1991)). Some possible proxies for the liquidity of a security
could be firm-size 01 its market value. Another characteristic of
panic behavior is the overreaction phenomenon of the market. By
trying to get rid of a security at any price (no limit orders) some
prices drop too much, while others drop too little. Thus, we may
find price reversal and correction on the following day.
An additional test of the relationship between the ASE and other
international stock exchanges can be made using securities which
are cross-listed on the Amsterdam and foreign exchanges. Because
of the time zone difference, it is interesting to compare stock ex-
changes where the hours of trade are not fully overlapping. For this
reason, one can compare the ASE with the New York and Tokyo
exchanges by using securities which are cross-listed in two ex-
changes. In this paper, we focus our attention on Dutch stocks listed
on the ASE, and also consider a sub-category of these stocks listed
on U.S. exchanges.
Another relationship which is used in the literature on "bubbles"
in a stock market is the relationship between ths accumulated rate
of increase in stock prices in the pre-crash period and the decline in
the crash period. Telscr (1989) and Roll (1989) find empirical sup-
port for a speculative bubble burst in October 1987, while Miller
(1991) views the period of prolonged price increase before October
1987 and then the sharp break as entirely rational. Since the nine-
month increase on the ASE before the crash was only 2.3%, we do
not expect an overall bubble phenomenon.
Trading Volume
Trading takes place due to changes in liquidity needs and release
of information. Research on trading activity suggests that it can
increase because of tlie heterogeneous interpretation by investors of
a given information release. It increases also vith identical inter-
pretation of information but with diverse prior expectations
(Karpoff (1986)). Panic behavior during a market crash will nor-
mally lead to a large volume of sell orders with no price limit.
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Selling pressure is expected to concentrate initially in larger and
more liquid securities. When market volatility increases with crash,
trading volume could be higher than normal, and this can continue
as lorg as uncertainty remains. It should be noted, however, that a
significant part of the decline in Amsterdam, which is normally
attributed to the second day, w£s actually the change between the
closing price of October 19 anc the opening price of October 20.
This change in stock prices occurred in the absence of any trade.
Karpoff (1987) considers the absolute magnitude of return as one
determinant of the volume of trade. A similar approach was under-
taken by Ben-Zion et al. (1990).
///. THE MODEL
In this section, we formulate an econometric model which is
estimated by using linear regression. We use both return regressions
and volume regressions. First, wj present the model for retirns. The
purpose of the model is to explain individual stock returns during
the crash. An obvious variable is the systematic risk variable whose
coefficient (as expected from the Capital Asset Pricing Model)
should be equal to the average market return for the period One can
also use other firm-specific characteristics such as firm-size, le-
verage, the ratio of book-to-maiket equity, the price-earnings ratio,
and foreign listings that explain the decline in different stocks. In
the CAPM framework, firm-specific characteristics should not
enter into return regressions which are only affected by systematic
risk. However, in panic behavior when investors make quick deci-
sions to sell securities, they may use firm characteristics to decide
which securities to sell. One may argue that people tend to sell the
more liquid securities which aie the stocks of larger fums. This
claim is also consistent with th; findings of Blume et al. (1990),
showing that S&P stocks suffered a higher decline than tion-S&P
stocks in the U.S. market, and with Lauterbach and Ben-Zion's
(1992) findings for the Israeli market. In addition, using monthly
data, Fama and French (1992) daim that firm-specific characteris-
tics eicplain cross-sectional return better than die systematic risk
even in normal periods.
Regarding the expected sign of the coefficients, we can make the
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following comments. The CAPM suggests a strong relation be-
tween return and beta, where relatively riskier stocks decline more
when the market declines. Panic behavior suggests that the size of
the firm is an important variable (the size of a fnn can be a proxy
for the liquidity of its stock). Since everyone tries to sell more liquid
stocks, the price of these stocks may decline more than the average
decline. Foreign listing could also be a factor, if one believes that
the world crash is stronger in the country of origin (in our example,
the U.S.). In this case, stocks which are traded in the U.S. would
decline more at least on the first day.
Another finding of the return behavior during the crash is the
overreaction phenomenon where the residuals of equations of con-
secutive period returns are highly negative correlated. This possible
overreaction effect can be estimated by using the previous period's
return as an explanatory variable for the current return. A strong
negative correlation suggests the possibility of potential arbitrage
profit. While a zero correlation is consistent with the efficient
market hypothesis, a positive correlation would indicate that the
event which led to market decline continued for more than one
trading period. The amount of potential arbitrage profit also de-
pends on the magnitude of the reversal coefficient.
On the basis of these arguments, we estimate the following equa-
tion:
Rt =/(Beta, Size, Foreign Listing, Lagged Returns) (1)
where,
R, = stock return in pe-iod t,
Beta = systematic risk of the stock,
Size = size of the firm proxied by the natural logarithm of market
value of equity,
Foreign Listing = dummy variable to indicate whether or not the
stock is traded or U.S. exchanges.
For the analysis of trading volume behavior, we consider two
alternate variables in order to measure trading activity. One variable
is the turnover ratio which is a fraction of the total number of
outstanding shares traded in a given period. Using the turnover
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ratio, rather than the trading volume in the number of shares or
monetary units, has the advantage of reducing heteroscedasticity.
The second variable is the relative turnover ratio where we perform
standardization using the average turnover ratio of the first nine
months of 1987. The underlying reason is that on a given day the
normal turnover ratio of different stocks may be differenl for rea-
sons such as ownership structure, size, riskiness, options avail-
ability, etc. By standardization we may possibly reduce the effect of
these variables and reveal the mere precise effect of a spec al event,
such as the crash.
Based on the literature on trading activity we also relate the
volunre of trade to some firm-specific characteristics suci as sys-
tematic risk, size, and foreign listing. In addition, we use the abso-
lute vilue of daily returns as a measure of the volatility of security
for the period. Finally, we use the lagged values of the turnover
ratio is an additional explanatory variable since the specif c factors
that induce trade of a stock on a given day may influence trading for
more than one day.
The estimated regression equation for volume is given as fol-
lows:
\'t =/(Beta, Size, Foreign Listing,
where,
V, = turnover ratio (with two alternative measures) in period /,
ARt = absolute value of stock retirn in period t,
Vt = turnover ratio in period t.
(2)
IV. DATA
The study considers 114 stocks continuously listed on the Am-
sterdam Stock Exchange from January 1984 until June 1989. These
stocks represent more than 80% of market capitalization of all listed
common stocks on the Exchange. The daily adjusted stock prices
for the ppriod 1984-1986, which are used to estimate the systematic
risk are collected from Datastream. We use the average of all the
114 stocks to calculate the market return (see Kabir (1990) for an
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additional description of the sample and data). The opening and
closing prices during the crash period are collected from the "Offi-
ciele Prijscourant" (the official newspaper of the Amsterdam Stock
Exchange). The daily returns are calculated as continuously com-
pounded returns. Data on daily trading volume are collected from
Stockdata and the financial press ("Officie'le Prijscourant" and
"Het Financieele Dagblad"), and data on the number of out-
standing shares from the Datastream. All additional data are col-
lected from the same daily Stock Exchange publication.
Regarding the options data, there are 19 stocks for which we
have option prices during October 1987. For each such stock we
have collected daily series of prices for four call options and four
put options for a period of six days around October 19. We have
kept the same option, i.e., same exercise price and same expiration
date so that we could calculate both overnight return and intraday
return on those options. Options that were not continuously traded
on all six days were omitted. In total, we have obtained 62 call and
67 put option prices (returns). We have also collected the 'trading




The descriptive statistics of returns and trading volume on the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange during the crash period are presented
in Tables 1 and 2. Although the major decline in share prices on the
ASE, like many other European exchanges was concentrated
mostly on the 19th and the 20th of October, the stock market con-
tinued to decline until early November. The largest one-day decline
was on the 19th of October (R19), and it was almost evenly divided
between the overnight (weekend) return (Z19) and the intraday
return (Y19). Splitting the total return of the 20th of October
(-5.7%) into overnight and intraday returns, we find that the over-
night return was -10.3%. It seems that the crash in the U.S. on
October 19 had a major effect on the overnight return of October 20
European Equity Markets and Corporate Financial Decisions














































































































Notes:The number written next to each variable corresponds to date of Ocbber 1987.
Retumvariables R are calculated based on closing prices of subsequent trading days.
Variables Z measure overnight return based on close-to-open prices, whilj variables
Y measureHntraday return calculated on the basis of open-to-close price cf the same
day. variables RW correspond to total return of the week (Monday to Friday) starting
from the 5th of October until the 13th of November. RJS87 refers to the otal return
of the portfolio of stocks during January-September 1987.
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(720) on the ASE. During the trading session of October 20, how-
ever, there was a positive intraday return of 4.7%, It is interesting to
note that, in absolute value, the overnight returns were twice as
much as the trading returns during the first three days of the crash.
This is in contrast to Miller's (1989) finding that the variance of
overnight returns is far lower than the variance of intraday returns.
Looking at the trading volume data in Table 2, we find that there
was a significant increase in volume on Octobsr 19, 20 and 21.
While 0.2% of shares were traded on the Exchange between Jan-
uary and September 1987, the number increased to 0.3% on Oc-
tober 19, 0.5% on October 20, and 0.4% on October 21 (see vari-
able TV). The significant increase in trading volume can also be
seen by looking at thenumber of shares traded (V) or at the relative
measure (RTV). In monetary units, the average daily turnover of
shares on the Exchange during the first nine months of 1987 was
614 million guilders. The four-day period during October 19-22
witnessed an increase of turnover to 1.8, 2.6, 1.8 and 1.8 billion
guilders, respectively.
There were many transactions and many price changes during
these days. For example, the shares of Royal Dutch (probably the
most liquid share on the ASE) had 155 sequences of transaction
prices on October 16. Ihe number of transactions went up to 360 on
the 19th and to 236 or the 20th. Of all the stocks listed on the ASE,
93% declined on October 19 and 79% declined on the following
day. Similar proportions are found in our sample. Using overnight
and intraday returns, ve find that 89% of the stocks declined on the
night between October 19 and 20, and 82% of the stocks increased
during the intraday return on October 20.
The descriptive statistics of options are reportsd in Table 3. It is
interesting to note thai the return on call option shows a much larger
decline on October IS (both on the overnight and intraday returns).
The decline in the overnight return of October 19 is relatively small
and correction took place in the following session (October 20).
This is unlike stocks where the largest decline was the overnight
return of October 19. For put options, however, the increase in
prices (positive return) starts on October 19 (overnight and intraday
return). It continued to the following night (R1920) and the correc-
tion in prices, i.e., decline took place in later sessions. We also
54 European Equity Markets and Corporate Financial Decisiors




































































































Notes: The number written next toeach variable corresponds tothe date in
October 1987. Variables V refer tothe number of shares traded an a partic-
ular date. Variables TV refer to the turnover ratio (trading volumeexpressed
as fraction of total outstanding shares), while variables RTV measure the
relatve turnover ratio (fraction of outstanding shares is standardized by the
average fraction of Jan.-Sep. 198^).
observe a large increase in the relative volume of trading for put
options in the first two days of the crash.
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Notes: The number writUn next to each variable corresponds to dates of October
1987. Variables R* refer to returns (overnight and intraday), and variables Vol* refer
to the ratio of option volume as a fraction of open interest (expressed in percentage).
Regression Results
The regression results, with daily close-to-dose returns as the
dependent variable, ire presented in Table 4. The result for October
19 (R19) indicates that the 9% decline was strongly influenced by
systematic risk and size of firms. Riskier and larger firms declined
more than did average ones. The phenomenon is consistent with the
U.S. experience where larger companies declined more on the first












































































































































































day of the crash, and gained more in the recovery, e.g., Blume et al.
(1989). A strong negative effect is also found for stocks which were
traded on U.S. exchanges. The returns of October 20 (R20) could
not be explained in our analysis by any of the firm characteristics
used. This may be due to the opposite direction of the market in the
overnight period (-10.3%) and the trading period (+4.7%).
Stock returns of October 21 are mostly characterized by a signifi-
cant inverse relationship with the returns of the previous two days.
This estimated reversal is a cross-sectional reversal rather than a
time-series one. In other words, the stocks that declined more than
the average on October 19 and 20 had increased above the average
on October 21. Most of the above-average losses of these two days
were probably recovered on October 21. From the statistical point
of view, the reversal coefficients are highly significant, and the level
of explanation is rather high. The regression results of October 22
show that larger firms have declined more than the average.
In the sample of options we have data for 62 calls and 67 puts for
19 underlying stocks. Here we run the regression explaining the
return of an option in a given trading session as a function of returns
in previous sessions. The most significant results are obtained from
trading on October 20. These are presented in Table 5. In case of
both call and put options, we find a significant nsgative coefficient
of previous returns which indicates the existence of overreaction in
option. In particular, the reversals hold for three previous trading
sessions in case of cal options, and two previous trading sessions in

































Notes: The number writter next to each variable corresponds to dates of October
1987. Variables R" refer to overnight or intraday returns. Absolute t values are men-
tioned below each coefficient.
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case of put options. We could not, however, find a significant over-
reaction in the returns of calls and puts for other trading sessions.
Th; regression results using trading volume are pressnted in
Table 6. In almost all regressions, previous periods' trading activi-
ties seem to be the most important explanatory variable. I sing the
turnover ratio as a dependent variable, we find that systematic risk
influenced the trading volume on October 19 and 20. Firm size had
some negative effect on October 20. The dummy variable for U.S.
trade was positive and significant only on October 19. In the rela-
tive turnover ratio regression, we find that larger firms tended to
have higher trading on the 19th of October. Firm size was not
significant on other days.
VI. STRATEGY
The basic idea of our strategy is to buy at the opening price (or
the c osing price) all stocks whose returns are below the average in
a given day, and sell short stocks whose returns are above the
average. For simplicity, the investment in each stock is of ;he same
magnitude (e.g., NLG ± 1) such that the net investment (and the
portfolio beta) is close to zero. We then sell this portfolio at the end
of a irading session (e.g., close of the day), or at the beginning of
the rext session (e.g., at the apening of the day), or at a later
period. One advantage of this portfolio strategy, which combines
long and short positions, is that it is not very sensitive to market
movements, and the net investment is rather low (an ideal hedging
portfolio is a zero-beta portfo io with zero net investment). The
argument for designing this strategy is to utilize possible cross-
sectional overreaction in the stock market during periods of large
price changes.
Fcr illustration, we construct five alternative portfolios, which
are selected at four alternative time periods. These are mentioned in
Table 7. Portfolio D is selected on the morning of October 19, and
held for one period until the cose of trading on the sams day, or
until the- next morning of October 20, or the end of day October 20,
and the morning of October 21 .Similarly, portfolio C was chosen at
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TABLE 7. Return on Selected Porfolios for Different Holding Periods
































































Notes: See Table 1.
until the morning of October 20. and so on. Portfolios A and B were
chosen on the morning of October 20. The choice of portfolio B is
based only on the overnight retim. while portfolio A includes also
the total return of October 19. Finally, portfolio E was selected at
the end of October 20. The results of these strategies for all portfo-
lios arc reported in Table 7.
We can clearly see the potential gain for those who sought a
portfolio at the bottom of the crash (morning October 20) and sold at
the end of the day or later. The one period return for portfolio A and
B was 5.2% or 4%, respectively. The three and five period returns
are evsn higher. Those who bought in the morning or the close of the
19th of October (i.e., before the large overnight decline of October
20) had some loss. The loss was -3.5% for portfolio C and -0.3% for
portfolio D. However, increasing the holding period for two more
days created positive returns for these portfolios: 2.8% aid 1.8%,
respectively. Choosing a portfolio at the end of October 20 (portfolio
E) did not seem to create any gain. This may indicate that the market
was h less of a panic (i.e., more rational and less overreacting)
during the trading day of October 20 than on the previous day. While
the gain from this strategy could be eliminated by transaction costs,
it is clear that a modified strategy with a smaller number of stocks
could be profitable, at least for some periods. On the other hand, it
is also possible that one ends up with portfolios still remaining
considerably risky.
Urt Ben-Zion and Rezaul Kabir
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The paper analyzes the daily return and trading volume on the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange during the October 1987 crash. The
results show a large increase in volatility and volume of trade
during the week of October 19. It seems that the crash in Am-
sterdam started in the overnight return (between October 16 and 19)
and continued to the morning of October 19 before the major crash
in the United States started. This decline may reflect a response to
the previous day's decline in the U.S. and Japan. The news of black
Monday (October 19) in the U.S. caused an additional overnight
drop in share prices in Amsterdam. As for options, we find that the
decline was reflected-mostly in call options (approximately 70%)
during the overnight and intraday sessions of October 19, and
showed not much influence of the event of black Monday in the U.S.
Put options had an earlier gain during the overright and intraday
returns of October 19, but an additional increase was achieved only
after the U.S. decline. We also observe a sharp increase in trading
volume for put option? during the crash.
Regarding the deterninants of stock returns, we find that system-
atic risk played a significant role on October 19, vhile firmsize was
also an important determinant during the declining stage of the
crash. This is consistent with panic trading where other firm charac-
teristics rather than systematic risk play an important role in in-
vestor decisions. Panic behavior also led to a cross-sectional over-
reaction during the crash. Finally, we have shown that overreaction
could be utilized by non-panic investors to make profits from
constructing some portfolios.
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